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The London Reasoning Workshop

The London Reasoning Workshop provides a regular focus for discussing research in the Psychology of Reasoning in the UK and the World. Formerly, apart from the four-yearly International Conference on Thinking, there has been no regular forum for reasoning research nationally or internationally.

The Workshop follows in the footsteps of the occasional Plymouth Reasoning Workshops, organised by Jonathan Evans, and other successful workshops, like the Neurocomputation and Psychology Workshop and the Rational Models of Cognition Workshop, in providing a more intimate experience than a large conference. Meetings are kept small, single track and provide more time for speakers to present their ideas for productive discussion.

The Workshop does not take place when the International Conference on Thinking is held every 4 years: 2008, Venice, 2012, London, Birkbeck, 2016 USA, Brown, 2020 Paris, Sorbonne.

Twelfth Workshop 18-19 July 2019

Eleventh Workshop 24-27 July 2018

Tenth Workshop 24-26 July 2017

Ninth Workshop 5-7 August 2015

Eighth Workshop 9-10 July 2014

  • Rakefet Ackerman, Valerie Thompson: Meta-Reasoning: What Can We Learn from the Metacognitive Approach?
  • Nilufa Ali, Nick Chater, Mike Oaksford: Interpretation, and Discounting in Causal Conditional Inference: Towards an Integrative Model
  • Nilufa Ali, Mike Oaksford, Nick Chater, Anne Schlottmann: Discounting and causal conditional inference in children as young as 5: Better than adults
  • Aimee Bright: The engine of thought is a hybrid: Roles of associative and structured knowledge in reasoning
  • Ruth Byrne, Orlando Espino: Counterfactuals and Embodied Representations
  • Nicole Cruz, Jean Baratgin, Aidan Feeney, Mike Oaksford, David Over: Ifs and Ors
  • Wim De Neys: Feedback and Bias: Advancing the Conflict Debate
  • Igor Douven; Jonah Schupback: The Role of Explanatory Factors in Updating
  • Shira Elqayam, Meredith R Wilkinson, Valerie A Thompson, Jonathan St B T Evans, David E Over: Models of inference from is to ought
  • Juan A García-Madruga, Sergio Moreno-Ríos: Rapid and free time responses to disjunctive inferences: the role of cognitive reflection
  • Vinod Goel: The Neuropsychology of Reasoning
  • Geoff Goodwin: Causal Deviance Revisited
  • Ikuko Hattori, Masanori Nakagawa, Yasuhiro Muir: A Inconsistency of Subjective Probability
  • Masasi Hattori: Probabilistic Representations in Syllogistic Reasoning and the Effects of Content and Figures
  • Phil Johnson-Laird, Geoff Goodwin: The Truth of Conditionals
  • Sunny Khemlani, Matt Lotstein, Phil Johnson-Laird: The Conditional Probability of Unique Events
  • Gernot D Kleiter: Modeling imprecise degrees of belief by distributions
  • Philipp Koralus: The Erotetic Theory of Reasoning
  • Robert Mackiewicz, Phillip Johnson-Laird, Sunny Khemlani, Monica Bucciareli: External Signs of Kinematic Mental Simulations
  • Sergio Moreno-Ríos, Ruth Byrne: When facts become false during inferential processing
  • Mary Parkinson, Ruth Byrne: Framing Effects in Moral Judgments about Risk
  • Guy Politzer: A physical implementation of De Finetti's 'logic of the probable'
  • Marco Ragni, Tobias Sonntag: Reasoning about spatial relations and conditionals: A model approach
  • Célia Rasga, Ana Cristina Quelhas, Ruth MJ Byrne: Children's counterfactual and false-belief inferences about reasons for actions
  • Matt Roser, Jonathan Evans, Nicolas Nair, Giorgia Fuggetta, Dries Trippas: Belief Bias in Conditional Reasoning - an fMRI study
  • Jing Shao, Jean Baratgin, Guy Politzer: A study of the sufficient conditional and the necessary conditional in Chinese
  • Valerie Thompson, Maia Gibb, Ian Newman, Gord Pennycook, Dries Trippas: Fast Logic and Slow Beliefs: Implications for Dual Process Theories
  • Eoin Travers, Aidan Feeney, Jonathan Rolison, Aimee Bright: Knowledge Selection and Response Dynamics in Category-Based Induction
  • Matthias Unterhuber: The New Tweety-Nixon Puzzle: Implications for Bayesian Models of Human Reasoning
  • Janneke van Wijnbergen-Huitink: The probability of iterated conditionals revisited
  • Meredith R Wilkinson, Shira Elqayam, David E Over, Valerie A Thompson, Jonathan St BT Evans: Theory of Mind Meets Deontic Introduction: Can We Understand an 'Ought' from an Intention?

Seventh Workshop 25-26 July 2013

Sixth Workshop 3-4 August 2011

Fifth Workshop 29-30 July 2010

Fourth workshop 27-28 July 2009

  • Jean-François Bonnefon: The rational toll and emotional benefits of reasoning to a just world
  • Marian Counihan: All premises aren't created equal: Considering logical operators in natural language settings
  • Igor Douven: The Adams family
  • Shira Elqayam: Inferring deontic conclusions from indicative premises
  • Jonathan Evans: Dual-process theories of reasoning: Types, systems and types of system
  • Andy Fugard: Conditional interpretation in a generalized probabilistic truth table task
  • Adam Harris: Coherence: Philosophical issues, psychological implications
  • Denis Hilton: The well-formedness of conditional performatives: A cognitive consistency approach
  • Stephen Jones: Parallel temporal and probabilistic discounting of costs
  • Sunny Khemlani: Disjunctive illusory inferences
  • Mike Oaksford: Enthymemes and probabilities
  • Niki Pfeifer: Do people understand probabilistic (non-) informativeness?
  • Marco Ragni: Spatial Relational Reasoning and Eye Movements: What does the reasoner's eye tell about the reasoning process?
  • Alessandra Tasso: In what conditions is the meaning of conditionals perceived as equivalent to the meaning of a corresponding disjunction?
  • Valerie Thompson: Fluency, the feeling of rightness, and analytic thinking
  • Hiroshi Yama: Cognition and Culture: Processing Models for Hindsight Bias

Third Workshop 18-19 August 2008

  • This year's London Reasoning Workshop served as a Festschrift for Jonathan Evans to honour his 60th birthday.
  • Programme

Second Workshop 28-29 August 2007

  • Sponsored by The British Academy

    The second London Reasoning Workshop, held in September 2007, focused on the Psychology of Conditionals and brought together the contributors of the forthcoming book Psychology of Conditionals, published by the Oxford University Press in 2009. Many of the contributors presented their chapters and other papers, not on this specific topic, were also presented.

  • Nilufa Ali: Causal interpretations affect conditional reasoning
  • Jean-François Bonnefon: Pragmatic conditionals, conditional pragmatics, and the pragmatic component of conditional reasoning
  • Adam Corner: Damned by faint praise – Source reliability & Bayesian inference
  • Wim De Neys: Counterexample retrieval and inhibition during conditional reasoning: Direct evidence from memory probing
  • Geoffrey Goodwin: Mental models and Boolean concept learning
  • Bob Kowalski: Conditionals in computational logic
  • Louis Lee: A theory of reverse engineering
  • Henry Markovits: Semantic memory retrieval, mental models, and the development of conditional inferences in young children
  • Nakagaki, Akira Is domain-specific reasoning in conditional reasoning tasks really domain-specific? Toward an integral theory of conditional reasoning
  • Ira Noveck: Separating out the pragmatics from the semantics in conditional reasoning
  • David O'Brien: The mental logic theory of conditional propositions
  • Mike Oaksford: Conditionals and constraint satisfaction: Reconciling mental models and the probabilistic approach?
  • David Over: Conditionals and non-constructive reasoning: The experimental evidence
  • Niki Pfeifer: Conditionals in mental probability logic
  • Geoffrey Politzer: Two aspects of reasoning competence: A challenge for current accounts and a call for new conceptual tools
  • Ana Cristina Quelhas: Semantic and pragmatic modulation with conditionals and mental models
  • Walter Schroyens: Logic and/in Psychology: The paradoxes of material implication and psychologism in the cognitive science of human reasoning
  • Keith Stenning: The logical response to a noisy world
  • Valerie Thompson: Towards a dual process model of conditional inference

First Workshop 14-15 September 2006

  • The first London Reasoning Workshop took place in September 2006 and served as a Festschrift for David Over on the occasion of his 60th birthday. The gathering brought together psychologists from all over the world to engage in a two-day workshop.
  • Linden Ball: Conditional expected utility and the acceptability of deontic health and safety rules
  • Jean-François Bonnefon: Modus tollens, modus shmollens
  • Shira Elqayam: Iterated conditionals
  • Jonathan Evans: Thinking and reasoning with everyday causal conditional statements
  • Aidan Feeney: Reasoning distinctions: Induction vs. deduction or system 1 vs. system 2?
  • Geoffrey Goodwin: Relational complexity and mental models in reason
  • Ulrike Hahn: What argumentation tells us about logic
  • Denis Hilton: Pragmatic aspects of the verb effect in causal explanation
  • Stefan Kaufmann: Independence in counterfactuals: Premise semantics, causality, and lumping
  • Ken Manktelow: Deontic perspectives
  • Mike Oaksford: Probability logic and the MP-MT asymmetry
  • Klaus Oberauer: Testing formal models of how people reason with conditionals
  • David Over: Conditionals and non-constructive reasoning
  • Harriet Over: Two systems for reasoning, two systems for learning
  • Guy Politzer: How is modus ponens? Still valid, thank you!
  • Walter Schroyens: Logic and/in Psychology: The paradoxes of material implication and psychologism in the cognitive science of human reasoning
  • Clare Walsh: Mental simulation of possibilities
  • Hiroshi Yama: Conditional reasoning and hindsight effect: A cross-cultural study of British, French, Korean, and Japanese