Document Actions

Recent publications

In press

    • Hahn, U., & Oaksford, M. (in press). The fallacies explained. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    • Hahn, U., Oaksford, M., & Harris, A. J. L. (in press). Testimony and argument: A Bayesian perspective. In F. Zenker (Ed.). Bayesian argumentation. Dordrecht: Springer.

    • Oaksford, M., & Hahn, U. (in press). Why are we convinced by the ad hominem argument?: Bayesian source reliability and pragma-dialectical discussion rules. In F. Zenker (Ed.). Bayesian argumentation. Dordrecht: Springer.
    • Oaksford, M., Chater, N., & Stewart, N. (in press). Reasoning and decision making. In Frankish, K., & Ramsey, W. (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of cognitive science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Books

Chapters in books

  • 2012
    • Chater, N., & Oaksford, M. (2012). Normative systems: Logic, probability, and rational choice. In K. Holyoak, & R. Morrison (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of thinking and reasoning (2nd ed.) (pp. 11-21). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Hahn, U., & Oaksford, M. (2012). Rational argument. In K. Holyoak, & R. Morrison (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of thinking and reasoning (2nd ed.) (pp. 277-299). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Oaksford, M. (2012). Reasoning. In N. Braisby & A. Gellatly (Eds.), Cognitive Psychology (2nd ed.) (pp. 366-392). Oxford: Oxford University Press
  • 2011
    • Chater, N., Oaksford, M., Heit, E., & Hahn, U. (2011). Inductive logic and empirical psychology. In D. Gabbay, S. Hartmann, & J. Woods (Eds.), The Handbook of the History of Logic: Inductive Logic (Volume 10) (pp. 553-624), Amsterdam: North Holland.
    • Oaksford, M., & Chater, N. (2011). Dual systems and dual processes but a single function. In K. I. Manktelow, D. E. Over, & S. Elqayam (Eds.), The science of reason: A Festschrift for Jonathan St.B. T. Evans (pp. 339-351). Hove, Sussex: Psychology Press.
  • 2010
    • Oaksford, M. and Chater, N. (2010). Cognition and conditionals: An introduction. In M. Oaksford and N. Chater (eds), Cognition and conditionals: Probability and logic in human thinking (pp. 3-36). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Oaksford, M. and Chater, N. (2010). Conditionals and constraint satisfaction: Reconciling mental models and the probabilistic approach? In M. Oaksford and N. Chater (eds), Cognition and conditionals: Probability and logic in human thinking (pp. 309-334). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Ali, N, Schlottmann, A., Shaw, C., Chater, N. and Oaksford, M., (2010). Conditionals and causal discounting in children. In M. Oaksford and N. Chater (eds), Cognition and conditionals: Probability and logic in human thinking (pp. 117-134). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Chater, N. and Oaksford, M. (2010). Epilogue: Open issues in the cognitive science of conditionals. In M. Oaksford and N. Chater (eds), Cognition and conditionals: Probability and logic in human thinking (pp. 389-402). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • 2008
    • Oaksford, M., Chater, N. and Hahn, U. (2008). Human reasoning and argumentation: The probabilistic approach. In J. Adler and L. Rips (eds), Reasoning: Studies of human inference and its foundations (pp. 383-413). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    • Hahn, U. and Oaksford, M. (2008). Inference from absence in language and thought. In N. Chater and M. Oaksford (eds), The probabilistic mind: Prospects for Bayesian cognitive science (pp. 121-142). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Oaksford, M. and Chater, N. (2008). Probability logic and the Modus Ponens-Modus Tollens asymmetry in conditional inference. In N. Chater and M. Oaksford (eds), The probabilistic mind: Prospects for Bayesian cognitive science (pp. 97-120). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Chater, N. and Oaksford, M. (2008). The probabilistic mind: Prospects for a Bayesian cognitive science. In N. Chater and M. Oaksford (eds), The probabilistic mind: Prospects for Bayesian cognitive science (pp. 3-31). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Chater, N. and Oaksford, M. (2008). The probabilistic mind: Where next? In N. Chater and M. Oaksford (eds), The probabilistic mind: Prospects for Bayesian cognitive science (pp. 497-510). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • 2007
    • Oaksford, M. and Hahn, U. (2007). Induction, deduction and argument strength in human reasoning and argumentation. In A. Feeney and E. Heit (eds), Inductive reasoning (pp. 269-301). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • 2006
    • Chater, N. and Oaksford, M. (2006). Mental mechanisms. In K. Fiedler and P. Juslin (eds), Information sampling and adaptive cognition (pp. 210-236). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • 2005
    • Chater, N., Heit, E. and Oaksford, M. (2005). Reasoning. In K. Lamberts and R. Goldstone (eds), The Handbook of Cognition (pp. 297-320). London: Sage Publications.
  • 2004
    • Oaksford, M. (2004). Reasoning. In N. Braisby and A. Gellatly (eds), Cognitive Psychology (pp. 418-455). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Chater, N. and Oaksford, M. (2004). Rationality, rational analysis and human reasoning. In K. Manktelow and M. C. Chung (eds), Psychology of reasoning: Theoretical and historical perspectives (pp. 43-74). Hove, Sussex: Psychology Press.
  • 2003
    • Oaksford, M. and Chater, N. (2003). Probabilities and pragmatics in conditional inference: Suppression and order effects. In D. Hardman and L. Macchi (eds), Thinking: Psychological perspectives on reasoning, judgment and decision making (pp. 95-122). Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
    • Oaksford, M. (2003). Reasoning. In L. Nadel (Ed.), Encyclopedia of cognitive science, Vol. 3 (pp. 863–869). London: Nature Publishing Group.
    • Chater, N. and Oaksford, M. (2003). Rational models of cognition. In L. Nadel (Ed.), Encyclopedia of cognitive science, Vol. 3 (pp. 826–829). London: Nature Publishing Group.
  • 2002
    • Chater, N. and Oaksford, M., (2002). The rational analysis of human cognition. In J. L. Bermúdez and A. Millar (eds), Reason and nature: Essays in the theory of rationality (pp. 135-174). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Moore, S. C. and Oaksford, M. (2002). An informational value for mood: Negative mood biases attention to global information in a probabilistic classification task. In S. C. Moore and M. Oaksford (eds), Emotional cognition (pp. 221-243). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
    • Moore, S. C. and Oaksford, M. (2002). Emotional cognition: An introduction. In S. C. Moore and M. Oaksford (eds), Emotional cognition (pp. 1-8). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Journal articles

  • 2012
    • Oaksford, M., & Chater, N. (2012). Dual processes, probabilities, and cognitive architecture. Mind and Society. doi:10.1007/s11299-011-0096-3
  • 2011
    • Jones, S., & Oaksford, M. (2011). Preferences show greater stability for transactions than for gambles in cost discounting. Frontiers in Psychology, 2, 293. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00293
    • Chater, N., Goodman, N., Griffiths, T., Kemp, C., Oaksford, M., & Tenenbaum, J. (2011). The imaginary fundamentalists: The unshocking truth about Bayesian cognitive science. Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 34, 194-196.
    • Oaksford, M., & Chater, N. (2011). The “is-ought fallacy” fallacy. Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 34, 262-263.
    • Jones, S. and Oaksford, M. (2011). Transactional problem content in cost discounting: Parallel effects for probability and delay. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,& Cognition, 37, 739-747.
    • Ali, N., Chater, N. and Oaksford, M. (2011). The mental representation of causal conditional inference: Causal models or mental models. Cognition, 119, 403-418.
    • Oaksford, M. (2011). Putting reasoning and judgement in their proper argumentative place. Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 34, 84-85.
    • Corner, A., Hahn. U. and Oaksford, M. (2011) The psychological mechanism of the slippery slope argument. Journal of Memory and Language 64, 133-152.
  • 2010
    • Chater, N., Oaksford, M., Heit, E. and Hahn, U. (2010b). Bayesian models of cognition. WIREs Cognitive Science, 1, 811-823.
    • McMurran, M., Oaksford, M. and Christopher, G. (2010). Does social problem solving mediate the relationship between personality traits and personality disorders? An exploratory study with a sample of male prisoners. Personality and Mental Health, 3, 180-192.
    • Oaksford, M. and Chater, N. (2010). Causation and conditionals in the cognitive science of human reasoning. Open Psychology Journal, 3, 105-118. (Special issue on Causal learning beyond causal judgment, Edited by J. C. Perales and D. R. Shanks).
  • 2009
    • Chater, N. and Oaksford, M. (2009). Local and global inferential relations: Response to Over (2009). Thinking and Reasoning, 15, 439-446.
    • Oaksford, M. and Chater, N. (2009a). The uncertain reasoner: Bayes, logic and rationality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32, 105-120.
    • Oaksford, M. and Chater, N. (2009b). Precis of “Bayesian rationality: The probabilistic approach to human reasoning.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32, 69-84.
  • 2008
    • Oaksford, M. (2008). Stimulus equivalence and the origins of reasoning, language and working memory. Cognitive Studies, 15, 392-407.
    • Oberauer, K. and Oaksford, M. (2008). Still in search of a good theory of reasoning: Rejoinder to Barrioullet, Gauffroy and Lecas (2008). Psychological Review, 115, 778.
    • Oberauer, K. and Oaksford, M. (2008). What must a psychological theory of reasoning explain? Comment on Barrioullet, Gauffroy and Lecas (2008). Psychological Review, 115, 773-778.
    • Oaksford, K., Oaksford, M., Ashraf, M. and Fitzgibbon, G. (2008). Comparing neuropsychological function before and during haemodialysis: A habituating selective deficit for prose recall. British Journal of Health Psychology, 13, 273-289.
  • 2007
    • Hahn, U. and Oaksford, M. (2007). The burden of proof and its role in argumentation. Argumentation, 21, 39-61.
    • Hattori, M. and Oaksford, M. (2007). Adaptive non-interventional heuristics for co-variation detection in causal induction: Model comparison and rational analysis. Cognitive Science, 31, 765-814.
    • Hahn, U. and Oaksford, M. (2007). The rationality of informal argumentation: A Bayesian approach to reasoning fallacies. Psychological Review, 114, 704-732.
  • 2006
    • Hahn, U. and Oaksford, M. (2006). A normative theory of argument strength. Informal Logic, 26, 1-22.
    • Oaksford, M. and Hahn, U. (2006). Non-monotonicity and informal reasoning: Comment on Ferguson. Argumentation, 20, 245-251.
    • Hahn, U. and Oaksford, M. (2006). A Bayesian approach to informal argument fallacies. Synthese, 152, 207-236.
    • Oaksford, M. (2006). Making connections in conditional inference [Review of If]. American Journal of Psychology, 119, 161-167.
  • 2005
    • Perham, N. R. and Oaksford, M. (2005). Deontic reasoning with emotional content: Evolutionary psychology or decision theory? Cognitive Science, 29, 681-718.
    • Sellen, J., Oaksford, M. and Gray, N. (2005). Schizotypy and conditional inference. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 31, 105-116.
  • 2004
    • Oaksford, M., Carlile, J. and Moore, S. C. (2004). Effects of reasoning, prior mood and personality on emotion. Psychologia, 47, 250-263.
    • Oaksford, M. and Moussakowski, M. (2004). Negations and natural sampling in data selection: Ecological vs. heuristic explanations of matching bias. Memory & Cognition, 32, 570-581.
    • Oaksford, M. and Hahn, U. (2004). A Bayesian analysis of the argument from ignorance. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58, 75-85.
  • 2003
    • Oaksford, M. and Chater, N. (2003). Optimal data selection: Revision, review and re-evaluation. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 10, 289-318.
    • Oaksford, M. and Chater, N. (2003). Conditional probability and the cognitive science of conditional reasoning. Mind & Language, 18, 359-379.
    • Chater, N., Oaksford, M., Nakisa, R. and Redington, M. (2003). Fast, frugal and rational: How rational norms explain behavior. Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes, 90, 63-86.
    • Oaksford, M. and Chater, N. (2003). Modeling probabilistic effects in conditional inference: Validating search or conditional probability? Revista Psychologica, 32, 217-242.
    • Oaksford, M. and Wakefield, M. (2003). Data selection and natural sampling: Probabilities do matter. Memory & Cognition, 31, 143-154.
    • Oaksford, M. and Chater, N. (2003). Computational levels and conditional reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition, 29, 150-156.
  • 2002
    • Moore, S. C. and Oaksford, M. (2002). Some long-term effects of emotion on cognition. British Journal of Psychology, 93, 383-395.
    • Oaksford, M. (2002). Predicting the results of reasoning experiments: Reply to Feeney and Handley. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 55A, 793-798.
    • Oaksford, M. (2002). Contrast classes and matching bias as explanations of the effects of negation on conditional reasoning. Thinking & Reasoning, 8, 135-151.
    • Oaksford, M., Roberts, L. and Chater, N. (2002). Relative informativeness of quantifiers used in syllogistic reasoning. Memory & Cognition, 30, 138-149.
  • 2001
    • Oaksford, M. and Chater, N. (2001). The probabilistic approach to human reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5, 349-357.
    • Oaksford, M. (2001). Language processing, activation and reasoning: A reply to Espino, Santamaria and Garcia-Madruga. Thinking & Reasoning, 7, 205-208.
    • Chater, N. and Oaksford, M. (2001). Human rationality and the psychology of reasoning: Where do we go from here? British Journal of Psychology, 92, 193-216.
Oaksford and Chater: Bayesian Rationality

Oaksford and Chater: Bayesian Rationality

 
Share this page